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Accounting has been a lead sector in the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS)
negotiations to reduce barriers to trade in professional services.  This is no accident.  Accounting
already has a substantial international component; the largest accounting firms have major
international presences and have been eager to operate in less restrictive environments.  Accounting
is coming to be understood as a vital infrastructural element of financial services, and as finance
becomes more global, accounting too should become more global.  Similarly, as large businesses
enterprises generally have become more international, their need for more international accounting
services has grown.  But, despite the considerable international presences of the major accounting
firms, virtually all countries maintain various types of restrictions that impede the flow of
accounting services across borders.  The consequences have been higher costs, poorer service to
clients, and reduced efficiency, as well as lower quality accounting/auditing standards in many
countries.  Substantial progress can and should be made to reduce the current barriers to freer trade
in accounting services.
1REDUCING THE BARRIERS TO INTERNATIONAL TRADE IN
ACCOUNTING SERVICES: WHY IT MATTERS, AND THE
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Lawrence J. White*




Accountants and accounting are essential -- though often undervalued -- elements of the
infrastructure of any enterprise.  Information about a firm’s financial accounts is vital for managers,
owners, and creditors; it is a key input for lenders’ and investors’ decisions as to whether, when, and
how to provide finance to enterprises.1  Accounting is thus an important part of the business sector
of any modern economy.
The growth of multinational enterprises generally and of multinational accounting firms in
particular has focused attention on issues related to international trade in accounting services.  This
attention, in turn, is part of a rising tide of interest in trade in a wide range of services.
The street-level disruptions at the Seattle Ministerial Conference of the World Trade
Organization in November-December 1999 were an unfortunate slowing of the general process of
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 For discussions of the role of information, including accounting information, in the processes
of finance, see White (1998) and Goldberg and White (2001).
2liberalizing international trade in goods and services.  Given the momentum of over five decades of
international progress in reducing the barriers to trade in goods and the recent substantial interest in
liberalizing trade in services, however, it seems likely that the Seattle events will represent only a
brief stumble on the path to freer international trade.
Prior to the Ministerial Conference, substantial progress had been made with respect to
establishing international commitments for freer trade in accounting services, and the continuation
of this progress seems likely.
The reasons for this progress, and why it matters, will be the major focus for this paper. 
Section II will briefly provide background on the nature of the progress that has been made.  In
Section III we will review why trade in services is different from trade in goods but also why the
economic gains from wider trade are just as important for services as they have been for goods. 
Section IV will describe the essential features of modern accounting services and the modern
accounting industry.  Section V will focus on the impediments to the efficient flows of accounting
services across borders.  Section VI will explore the issues surrounding a related topic: the question
of whether the differing accounting standards or frameworks that are used in different countries
constitute a serious impediment for accounting services and whether harmonization of these
standards is the right approach.  Section VII will review the framework in which trade-in-services
negotiations take place and the specific advances in that framework that have been achieved for
accountancy.  Section VIII then discusses the road ahead for negotiations specifically with respect
to accounting services.  And Section IX provides a brief conclusion.
3II.  Background
Beginning in the late 1970s there was a growing realization that trade in services should be
the next major area for reductions in barriers.  Since the end of the Second World War substantial
progress had been made in reducing barriers to trade in goods through a succession of multilateral
negotiating "rounds" under the auspices of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). 
Though international trade in goods was hardly free of all protectionist restraints and considerably
more progress could (and would) be made, trade in services had been largely untouched.
Trade in services became a major topic of discussion during the so-called Uruguay Round
of GATT negotiations of the late 1980s.  Those negotiations ultimately led to the creation of the
World Trade Organization (WTO), as the successor to the GATT, and to a General Agreement on
Trade in Services (GATS), which has served as the vehicle for the specific negotiations concerning
reductions in the barriers to international trade in services.
Included in these negotiations has been a major initiative focusing on professional services.
 The WTO Working Party on Professional Services (WPPS),2 which came into existence in 1995,
selected accounting as the first of the professional services areas for the development of a set of
multilateral "disciplines": rules that limit the protectionist nature of the domestic regulatory
requirements that typically apply to accountants and accounting.  These multilateral disciplines
were adopted by the WTO’s Council on Trade in Services in December 1998 and will serve as the
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 The WPPS has since been transformed into the Working Party on Domestic Regulation.
4bases for reductions in international restrictions at the conclusion of future negotiations.3  Earlier (in
1997) the WPPS completed the development of guidelines for the negotiation of mutual recognition
agreements (MRAs) that would apply to professional qualifications of accountants in various
countries.  These guidelines were adopted by the Council in May 1997.
The choice of accounting as a lead sector for reducing barriers was not accidental. 
Accounting already has a substantial international component; the largest accounting firms have
major international presences and have been eager to operate in less restrictive environments. 
Accounting is coming to be understood as a vital infrastructural element of financial services, and
as finance becomes more global, accounting too should become more global.  Similarly, as large
businesses enterprises generally have become more international, their need for more international
accounting services has grown.
Despite the considerable international presences of the major accounting firms, however,
virtually all countries maintain various types of restrictions that impede the flow of accounting
services across borders.  The broad provisions of the GATS and the multilateral accounting
disciplines that were adopted by the WTO in 1998 will apply only after further negotiations are
completed; in the interim WTO members are committed to a "standstill" arrangement: They will
forbear from imposing heightened trade barriers to trade in accounting services.4
The substantial barriers that are currently in place provide prime targets for efforts to reduce
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 For a general discussion of the adoption of these disciplines, see Ascher (1999).
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 It was the absence of here-and-now progress, as well as concerns about the weakness of the
disciplines, that caused the International Federation of Accountants (IFAC) to express tepid support
for the disciplines; see IFAC (1998).
5and remove restrictions.  Even in the wake of the Seattle experience, substantial progress can and
should be made.
6III.  Why International Trade In Services Is (and Isn’t)
Different from Trade in Goods
In many respects international trade in services is importantly different from trade in goods.
 Indeed, the fact that multilateral negotiations on trade in services began in earnest four decades
after the beginning of multilateral negotiations on trade in goods is a testament to this difference.
On the other hand, there is at least one important way in which trade in services is not
different: in providing the potential for improving a country’s allocation of resources and thus
raising its overall standard of living.
This Section will first explore this latter notion, in order to motivate the general discussion
in this paper of the importance of reducing the barriers to international trade in accounting services.
 We will then turn to the important ways that services are different.
A.  Trade in services isn’t different: improving efficiency.
The basic economics argument for reducing or eliminating impediments to trade rests on the
improvements in efficiency in the allocation of a country’s resources that result from such actions.5 
In essence, trade allows a country to focus its resources and energies on what it does relatively
better than the rest of the world, importing those things that it does less well and paying for its
imports by exporting the things that it does especially well.  Though there are legitimate theoretical
exceptions that can be offered to the free trade argument, the fundamental case for free trade is a
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 The case for free trade can be found in any international economics text; see, for example,
Yarbrough and Yarbrough (1997).
7powerful one, and it has now been buttressed by decades of empirical evidence indicating that
reduced barriers to trade generally have had the beneficial effects that have been promised.
Though the case for free trade is almost always couched in terms of flows of goods, the
same principles apply equally validly to trade in services.  If a country is relatively less efficient at
producing a set of services than are some other countries, then the first country will generally be
better off by allowing the others to supply those services and instead focusing its resources on the
goods and services in which it is relatively more efficient.
At its heart, the case for the beneficial consequences from free (or freer) trade is just the
case for competitive markets, expanded to an international context.  The case for competitive
markets applies equally validly to services as to goods; so does the case for free trade.
B.  The ways in which trade in services is different.
Understanding international trade in goods is relatively straightforward:  Goods can be seen.
 They move physically across borders.  Their movement is easy to visualize, as are many of the
impediments to their movement: tariffs, quotas, and even more subtle impediments, such as
customs delays at borders, regulatory procedures that favor national producers over foreign
producers, etc.
By contrast, trade in services is different, in at least two important ways.  First, services are
usually intangible.  They can’t be seen, held, touched, or smelled.  They usually don’t physically
cross borders the way that goods do.  Second, services are often extensively regulated by
governments -- more often than is true for goods.  Appreciating both differences is useful for
understanding why liberalization negotiations have been slower for services than for trade.
81.  Services are intangible.  Because services are invisible (indeed, international services
remittances are sometimes described as part of "invisibles" in discussions of a country’s balance of
payments), they are not delivered in the same way as is true for goods.  The four following methods
of delivery are listed in Article I of the GATS and are frequently described as the four modes of
supply under the GATS:
a.  Cross-border.  Some services do actually cross borders.  This is true for
electricity and electronic information and also for some financial services (e.g., a bank that has its
offices in country A may grant a loan to or accept a deposit from a customer that is located in
country B).  But these services do not stop and wait at a port of entry, while a customs official
inspects and categorizes them and levies a duty.  Instead they move instantaneously and invisibly.
b.  Consumption abroad.  Some services involve the travel of the customer from
Country B to the location of the enterprise that offers the services in country A.  Tourism is a
common example.
c.  Commercial presence.  Some services may best be delivered through the
establishment of a physical presence at one or more specific locations.  For example, a bank that is
headquartered in Country A may prefer to establish a branch location in Country B in order to do
business with customers in the latter country.  Many long-term service relationships are best
developed and enhanced through the local presence of physical establishments.
d.  Temporary presence (presence of natural persons).  Some services may be
provided on a temporary basis, through the nationals of Country A visiting Country B to deliver the
services.  Entertainment services (e.g., concerts by visiting orchestras or rock stars), short-term
consultancies, or construction services can be delivered in this fashion.
9Some services may be capable of being delivered through more than one of these methods
and/or through a combination of them.
The commercial presence method is common in services.  But this commercial presence
means that the delivery of the service in country B will require a services firm that is headquartered
in Country A to make investments in Country B in order to establish that location.  And also
personnel from the service deliverer’s headquarters will have to make on-site visits to the branch
location in Country B: to deliver services, to hire local personnel, to supervise those personnel, etc. 
This need for investment and staffing that must originate from Country A in order to deliver
services in Country B clearly makes the process of delivering services across borders more
complicated than is true for the simple shipment of goods, and it provides greater and more subtle
opportunities for governments to impede the flow of services.  Restrictions on inbound foreign
investment (including ownership structures and arrangements), on immigration, and on commercial
location and establishment will all serve to restrict the inflow of imported services.
The delivery of accounting services is highly dependent on the physical presence of local
establishments (i.e., the "commercial presence" method).  In addition, the larger accountancy firms
(see Section IV) make liberal use of short-term consultancies (i.e., the "temporary presence"
method) in their efforts to mobilize specific sources of expertise within their firms.  Whether the
continuing technological revolution in telecommunications and data processing will allow
accountancy to be less dependent on these methods and instead to be able to provide more of their
services from afar -- i.e., the "cross-border" method -- remains an open question.
As will be discussed in Section V, given the current methods of delivering accounting
services, the types of restrictions discussed above are indeed important impediments to the freer
10
flow of accounting services.
2.  Regulation.  Services are more prone to various forms of governmental regulation or
outright government ownership.  As of the 1970s, the typical list of industries in the U.S. that were
described as "heavily regulated" (or, outside of the U.S., were either regulated or in the hands of
governments) included transportation services (air, rail, road, water), telecommunications services
(broadcasting, telephony), financial services (banking, insurance, securities), and electricity.6  It was
this same list of industries that became the prime targets for the deregulation efforts of the late
1970s and the 1980s in the U.S. (and for deregulation/privatization efforts in other countries). 
Despite the substantial deregulation that has occurred, however, these sectors continue to be more
regulated than most other areas of the U.S. economy.7
In addition, professional services (e.g., medical, legal, accounting, architecture, engineering)
have been subject to extensive direct and indirect governmental regulation.  The direct form of
regulation occurs through the actions of formal government agencies.  The indirect form occurs
when governments delegate to professional organizations many of the regulatory roles that would
otherwise be exercised by government; but even with such delegations the ultimate regulatory
powers are still held by governments.
The reasons for the extensive government involvement in the delivery of these services are
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 For example, the U.S. airline industry was substantially deregulated between 1978 and 1984. 
Nevertheless, there remains today a ceiling of 25% foreign ownership that applies to any airline that
serves domestic routes.  Effectively, foreign ownership of domestic U.S. airlines is not permitted. 
Similar restrictions apply to ocean shipping; see White (1988) and Fox and White (1995).
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varied, but consumer protection is a common theme.8  In turn, consumer protection may be couched
either in terms of protection against the exercise of monopoly power or in terms of protection
against the abuses that could arise because of the complicated nature of the services and the
superior knowledge of the services provider vis-a-vis the customer.9  But it is an easy jump from
regulation that is supposed to protect consumers to regulation that is "captured" by the regulated
entities; in the latter case, regulation may well harm consumers by protecting the incumbent
services providers from the rigors of competition.10
This extensive overlay of regulation of many services thus adds important extra elements to
any efforts to liberalize international trade in these services.  First, the regulation is present, and,
arguably, it is there for a reason.  Efforts to liberalize trade have to confront the question as to
whether trade in services is compatible with the protections that the regulation is supposed to be
providing.  Next, there are extra procedures, extra laws, extra agencies that must be dealt with.  And
there are the incumbent firms that can wrap themselves in the mantle of consumer protection and
argue to home-country government officials that this protection will be weakened if providers from
abroad are allowed under the tent.
As will be discussed in Section V, these patterns of professional-services regulation apply
squarely to accounting.
In sum, services are different.  Their mode of delivery and their tendency to be regulated
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have created delays and extra barriers to the opening of trade in services.  Indeed, the structure of
the GATS recognizes these differences, setting less ambitious goals for the dismantling of barriers
in the services areas than is true for goods.  Nevertheless, the GATS represents a substantial effort
toward freer trade in services, and accounting services are an important part of that effort.  It is to a
deeper exploration of accounting services that we now turn.
13
IV.  Accounting Services in International Trade: A Snapshot
A.  Accounting services.11
The scope of "accounting services" is usually understood to include
accounting/bookkeeping (measuring and recording the financial flows and positions of an
enterprise), auditing (verifying and attesting/certifying the accuracy of the financial position and
results of the enterprise, for internal or external purposes), and tax preparation.  The three activities
are clearly closely related.
In addition, over the past few decades the largest accounting firms -- especially in the U.S. -
- have become actively involved in management consulting, and growth in this area has been
considerably more rapid than for the firms’ more traditional services.  As can be seen in Table 1, as
of 1998 management consulting contributed almost half (47%) of the domestic revenues of the 100
largest U.S. accounting firms, with accounting/auditing/tax services contributing the remainder
(53%).  For the largest of the large -- the Big Five12 firms -- the corresponding percentages were
51% and 49%, respectively.  For the Big Five, their defining services are no longer their dominant
sources of revenues!13  Between 1997 and 1998 management consulting revenues grew by 38% for
both the largest 100 and the Big Five. 
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Marwick, and Deloitte & Touche.
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Management consulting has been a natural, synergistically related service for the large
accounting firms.  Through the provision of their traditional accounting/auditing/tax services, they
acquire a considerable amount of detailed information about an enterprise’s operations, which they
then use, enhanced with additional expertise, to help the enterprise develop and achieve its tactical
and strategic goals.  One of the latest facets of management consulting by accounting firms --
information systems consulting -- is again a synergistic use of their expertise as information
handlers and users.
The auditing function of these firms has gained special significance in the past few decades
with the rise in importance of publicly traded companies and the securities markets.  Investors in
and lenders to publicly traded enterprises rely heavily on those enterprises’ audited financial
statements as an accurate statement of the enterprise’s financial position and results.  Bond
covenants and banks’ lending agreements often contain restrictions couched in terms of the financial
flows and positions of the borrowing enterprise, measured according to generally accepted
accounting principles (GAAP) and certified through an audited financial statement.  Indeed, the
certification value of the Big Five accounting firms has become so great that virtually all of the
"Fortune 500" U.S.-based companies are audited by the Big Five, and a high fraction of the next
500 are also audited by the Big Five.  If the largest three14 of the next tier of accounting firms are
included, the coverage of the "Fortune 1000" is virtually complete.15  Similarly, when young
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 A study of the auditors of the largest publicly traded non-financial companies, as of 1995,
found that the Big Six (now Big Five) audited all 241 of the companies with assets over $5 billion,
548 of the 551 companies with assets between $1 billion and $5 billion, and 363 of the 372
companies with assets between $0.5 billion and $1.0 billion; see Doogar and Easley (1995).
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companies first issue securities through initial public offerings (IPOs), the investment
bankers/underwriters that shepherd the new issues into the securities markets almost always insist
on the certifying value of one of these eight or so largest accounting firms.
As another indication of the dominance of the Big Five firms, in 1999 the 100 largest
accounting firms in the U.S. had aggregate revenues of about $31 billion (including management
consulting revenues); the Big Five constituted 89.9% of this total.16
B.  The international dimension.
Despite the limitations and restrictions on their international activities that will be discussed
in the next Section, the largest accounting firms have all developed substantial international
presences.  Much of this spread of international presence has occurred as a consequence of the
international growth of their clients and the desire of the individual clients to retain their accounting
firms across international boundaries.  The expertise and prestige of the largest accounting firms
have also allowed them to acquire overseas clients that have no roots in the accounting firms’ home
countries and/or to affiliate with local accounting firms, forming networks and partnerships under a
common brand name.
The overall effects have been striking.  Though four of the Big Five accounting firms are
headquartered in the U.S. (and though the fifth, KPMG, is headquartered in Amsterdam it has a
strong U.S. presence and orientation), the Big Five now derive approximately 65% of their
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revenues from locations outside of the U.S.17  Table 2 lists the numbers of countries in which the
largest twenty accounting firms/networks have locations.  The Big Five tend to be in the most
locations, but even the smaller networks can be found in dozens of countries.
Further, the Big Five are by far the largest accounting firms in the world, as is indicated in
Table 3.  As can be seen, the Big Five together account for 77% of the revenues of the 40 largest
international accounting networks, and there is a sharp drop between the sizes of the fifth firm
(Deloitte) and the sixth (BDO).  Further, of the 100 largest firms worldwide (as measured by market
value at the end of 1999), the Big Five audited 98 of them.18
It is also worth noting that, of the dozen largest accounting firms worldwide, nine are
headquartered in the U.S., two are headquartered in the U.K., and one is headquartered in the
Netherlands.  These dozen largest firms thus have a strong North American/Western European
orientation.  This worldwide dominance by trans-Atlantic oriented firms is partly explained by the
worldwide presence of large North American and Western European-headquartered corporations
generally (and the desire of these corporations to retain their domestic accounting firms as they
expand abroad) and partly by the large base that these trans-Atlantic economies have provided and
the greater relative importance that these countries’ economies, securities markets, and securities
laws (especially in the U.S. and the U.K.) have placed on accounting and auditing.
The international presences by these large accounting firms have special features.  As
Tables 2 and 3 indicate, these international accounting firms are often described as "networks."  The
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 See Accountancy International, Vol. 125 (April 2000), p. 12.
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firms themselves are always partnerships, and their affiliations and alliances across international
borders are fluid and varied; indeed, in the international context, the characterization of the large
firms as "partnerships of partnerships" is quite apt.19  The annual data compilation in Accountancy
International, from which the data for Tables 2 and 3 were drawn, has a separate column for the
number of "member firms" that comprise each of the major networks.  Ernst & Young, for
example, lists 123 member firms; KPMG lists 146.
These fluid and varying arrangements with respect to local affiliates are often adaptations
and accommodations to the local limitations imposed by national governments (to be discussed in
the next Section).  Nevertheless, despite these limitations, the "brand name" of each of the large
firms -- especially the Big Five -- is important, and their international presences are substantial.
Another aspect of the international presence and dominance by the large U.S.-headquartered
(or U.S.-oriented) accounting firms is their consequences for the U.S. balance of payments.  In 1998
U.S. direct exports of "accounting, auditing, and bookkeeping services" plus "management,
consulting, and public relations services" totaled $2.0 billion, while imports of the same categories
of services totaled $1.2 billion, yielding a net export surplus of $0.8 billion.20  In 1996 the sales of
"accounting, research, management and related services" by overseas affiliates of U.S. firms to
foreign purchasers totaled $7.7 billion, while the U.S. affiliates of foreign companies sold $2.0
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 See Mann et al. (1999).  These export and import flows include intra-firm transactions that
crossed borders.  The "management, consulting, and public relations services" category includes
companies that are not accounting firms.  It is also worth noting that for "accounting, auditing, and
bookkeeping services" alone, the U.S. had a small net export surplus in 1998 of $15 million; larger
net export surpluses were experienced in the early 1990s.
18
billion of the same category of services to U.S. purchasers;21 thus the net flow of sales was a
positive $5.7 billion by U.S. firms.
Despite these substantial international presences and magnitudes of transactions by the large
accounting firms, the extensive local regulation of accounting services makes these international
operations more difficult and costly than would otherwise be the case.  It is to these impediments
that we now turn.
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V.  The Impediments to Trade in Accounting Services
As a professional service (like medicine, law, architecture, engineering, etc.), accounting
has been subject to substantial domestic regulation in virtually all countries.22  Though the detailed
requirements vary from country to country, accountants typically must satisfy education and
practical experience requirements and must satisfy a local residency requirement, and often must
pass a qualifying/licensing exam.  The organizational form/structure of accounting firms is typically
restricted as well.  Accounting firms are often limited to partnerships or sole proprietorships;
corporate forms are often prohibited.  And ownership of accounting firms is often limited to
accounting professionals.
Further, the forms and procedures involved in the service itself -- e.g., accounting standards
and auditing procedures -- are usually regulated.  Sometimes, advertising or other forms of
promotion and price competition are restricted or prohibited.
Regulation usually occurs at the national level, but in some countries -- notably, the U.S.,
Canada, and Australia -- regulation has devolved to the state or province level and varies among
jurisdictions.23  Regulation may be carried out by formal governmental agencies or be delegated to
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restrictions discussed later in this Section (e.g., restrictions on the mobility of personnel, restrictions
on payments, inadequate protection for intellectual property, "buy national" policies by
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 For a summary of the variations in accounting regulations across the 50 United States, see
AICPA/NASBA (1998).
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professional organizations or be combined in a mixture of the two.
The surface goal of such restrictions is consumer protection: to ensure that only qualified
individuals provide the service, that the integrity and quality (independence, objectivity) of the
service and the service provider are maintained, that conflicts of interest are minimized, and that
aggrieved consumers have the opportunity for obtaining redress.
The goal of consumer protection can be readily subverted, however.  These types of
restrictions are barriers to entry.  If enforced perfectly, the restrictions would exclude only the
charlatans and quacks.  But incumbent providers will always realize that the restrictions -- perhaps,
with some supplements -- can also be used to exclude competitors more broadly.  Further, as
technologies change and improve and as customer competence and capabilities improve, regulatory
restrictions that might have been necessary or at worst harmless in one era may become
inappropriate and seriously distortionary in a later era.  But the forces of inertia, buttressed by the
vested interests of protected incumbents, are more powerful when regulatory institutions and
procedures are in place.
This appears to be the case for accounting services.  As was documented in Section IV, the
major accounting firms are international in structure; international trade in accounting (and related)
services is a substantial reality.  But the widespread local regulatory restrictions that these firms
face force them into inefficient compromises that restrict the freer flow of personnel and
information as well as restricting organizational forms and structures that would allow greater
efficiency.  The inevitable consequence is higher costs, poorer service to their clients, and reduced
efficiency.
The following is a list of frequently cited examples of restrictions and restraints imposed by
21
one or more countries that favor domestic incumbents and discriminate against non-citizen
providers, thereby inhibiting freer trade and greater efficiency in accounting services:24
-- Nationality requirements with respect to who can offer local accounting services.
-- Residence or establishment requirements.
-- Restrictions on the international mobility of accounting personnel.
-- Restrictions as to the use of the brand names of firms, or requirements that only local
names be used.
-- Restrictions on advertising or other promotional efforts; restrictions on price competition.
-- Quantitative limits on the provision of services.
-- Restrictions on the services that accounting firms can and cannot provide.
-- Restrictions on who can be an owner of an accounting firm; e.g., requirements that all or
a specified number or fraction of the owners of an accounting firm be local citizens; be residents; be
active in the business of the firm; be locally-licensed; be members of an approved professional
organization.
-- Restrictions as to the legal form or structure that an accounting firm must have (e.g.,
prohibitions on a corporate form).
-- Discriminatory arrangements with respect to the licensing of foreign accountants,
including applications, testing, assessments of educational qualifications, relevant experience.
-- Differential taxation treatment.
-- Restrictions on international payments for services.
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-- Restrictions on cross-border flows of information.
-- Inadequate protections for the intellectual property related to accounting services, such as
computer software.
-- "Buy national" practices of governments with respect to their purchases of accounting
services.
It is worth noting that even in instances where the restrictions appear to affect domestic
incumbents and foreign entrants similarly (e.g., restrictions on advertising), the effect is likely to be
differentially adverse to the foreign entrant, since the entrant may need advertising or other
promotion to enter and expand in a market dominated by domestic incumbents.
In many instances it is the larger accounting networks that are prevented from expanding
and strengthening their international presences.  Since the cultures of these larger networks are
those of relatively high accounting and auditing standards, an ironic consequence (for a professional
service where a major rationale for local regulation is consumer protection and the maintenance of
high quality) of these restrictions has surely been quality standards for accounting and auditing in
many countries that are lower than they otherwise could be.
Similar compilations of restrictions have been available since at least the early 1980s.25  As
the interest in trade in services has grown and as negotiations have become more substantive in the
1990s, the compilations have become more frequent as well.26  Comparisons of the lists from the
1980s with those of the 1990s show a striking similarity in the types and nature of the restrictions.
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Though simple comparisons by themselves cannot indicate the presence or absence of any
progress in the removal of restrictions, there is a strong sense that progress has been only modest. 
Indeed, as was noted in Section II, it was the absence of immediate progress in reducing barriers
that contributed to the International Federation of Accountants’ disappointment with the WTO’s
adoption of the multilateral disciplines at the end of 1998.
There is thus considerable room for future negotiations to convert many countries’
expressions of good intentions in removing restrictions into a freer flowing reality.
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VI.  Differing Accounting Standards: How Important Is Harmonization?
The differing accounting frameworks or standards that are in use in most countries are often
described as part of the barriers to freer trade in accounting services.  In reality, they are at most a
modest barrier.  Instead, these differing accounting standards have more importance for the
operations of international capital markets and for the operations of international enterprises more
generally.
Nevertheless, because the issues of differing accounting standards and potential
harmonization of standards are frequently linked to discussions of liberalization of international
trade in accounting services,27 and they are important in their own right, they deserve some
discussion here.28
A.  Are differing accounting standards a barrier to liberalization?
In principle, the differing accounting frameworks that are in force in different countries are
a barrier to the liberalization of trade in accounting services.  Differing standards place extra
burdens on international firms and make the movement of personnel somewhat more costly. 
Incumbent domestic firms thereby gain a modest advantage vis-a-vis foreign-based firms.  And
differing accounting frameworks do appear as a barrier on many lists of impediments to freer trade.
But differing accounting frameworks have not been adopted or manipulated as a specific
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 See, for example, Ascher (1999).
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 Harmonization of accounting standards has received extensive discussion in the academic
accounting literature; see, for example, Nobes (1996), Wyatt (1997), and Mueller (1997).
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effort to protect domestic incumbent accountants vis-a-vis entrants from abroad.  Further, the
international accounting firms face similar differential burdens with respect to differing local
spoken languages and differing local legal systems.  The international accounting firms readily
adapt to those differing frameworks, and they have readily adapted to differing accounting
standards.  Differing accounting frameworks appear to be a modest barrier at most.  If
harmonization proves to be worthwhile, it will be for the reasons discussed below, and not as a
major initiative to liberalize trade in accounting services.
B.  The value from accounting harmonization -- and some cautions.
The real value from eliminating the differences in national accounting systems and
harmonizing on a common system lies elsewhere -- in reducing international enterprises’ accounting
costs, in helping integrate international capital markets, and in serving as the guise whereby
countries with deficient accounting frameworks are induced to improve their accounting standards.
 But harmonization also has drawbacks that warrant discussion.
1.  Reducing accounting costs.  To the extent that an enterprise operates in different
jurisdictions and must prepare financial reports for the different jurisdictions according to differing
accounting frameworks, its costs are higher than if it could use a single framework.  Further, to the
extent that the enterprise additionally uses a single framework for its own informational purposes,
its costs are yet higher.
2.  Integrating international capital markets.  As the rapid technological improvements in
telecommunications and data processing dramatically reduce the costs of transmitting and analyzing
information, providers and users of capital around the globe are increasingly being brought into
26
transactions with each other.  To the extent that the borrowers/users employ differing accounting
frameworks among themselves, the tasks of the lenders/investors in comparing and assessing risks
and prospects are made more difficult; in the parlance of microeconomics, differing accounting
frameworks increase the transactions costs of operating in international capital markets. 
Harmonization to a common standard can reduce those transactions costs and promote the
smoother flow of capital across international boundaries.29
3.  Improving deficient standards.  Where countries have deficient (poor quality) accounting
frameworks -- as is often the case in developing countries -- the effort at international
harmonization (which takes the developed world’s standards as its general base) could serve as the
means for raising the quality of the accounting frameworks in these countries.  Arguably, a similar
process has been at work with respect to the international harmonization of capital requirements for
banks.30
3.  Some cautions.  The case for harmonization to reduce the costs of capital is strongest
where the accounting differences are arbitrary and serve no useful distinguishing purposes, or where
harmonization is the guise for strengthening (e.g., increasing the transparency of) a country’s weak
accounting framework.  But the differences may reflect adaptations to different characteristics of
different economies: for example, whether an economy has had periodic bouts of severe inflation,
which might call for revaluations of financial stocks and flows, or has experienced only modest
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inflation, which might call for the avoidance of the vagaries that could accompany revaluations.31 
Further, there are serious conceptual/philosophical questions as to whether financial accounting
should have a stewardship focus, which would call for an orientation toward historical costs, or a
current-value focus.
Accordingly, harmonization is not a win-only proposition.  Valuable adaptations to local
conditions may be lost, and serious alternatives may be discarded.  Further, with a single
harmonized standard, the opportunities for localized experimentation and development of new
alternatives are eliminated.  Rigidities in accounting may be exacerbated.
In sum, harmonization carries potential costs as well as benefits.  A weighing of both is
warranted before judgments are made.
C.  Historical developments.
The International Accounting Standards Committee (IASC), created in 1973, has been the
main body that has focused on developing "international accounting standards" (IASs) that would
be commonly adopted internationally and thus would be the harmonized standard.  The creation of
the International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) in 1986 and its interests in the
development of IASs reinforced the mission of the IASC.
In 1995, the IOSCO and the IASC agreed that the latter should make a concerted effort to
develop a set of core standards that the IOSCO could endorse and that its member countries could
adopt for cross-border securities offerings and other foreign listings.  Also the European Union was
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 For discussions of these differential adaptations, see Pownall and Schipper (1999) and
Gebhardt (2000).
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encouraging its member states to allow their companies to use IASs and to accept each other’s
companies’ financial statements (on a mutual recognition basis) for listing on each other’s securities
exchanges.
The IASC completed its tasks at the end of 1998, and decisions by IOSCO and its
constituent members are awaited.32  A crucial role will be played by the U.S. Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC).  The SEC has historically resisted other countries’ accounting
standards, insisting that any non-U.S. company that wanted to have its securities publicly traded in
the U.S. must restate its financial accounts to U.S. generally accepted accounting principles
(GAAP).33  The U.S. Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) issued a lengthy report in late
199934 that was quite critical of the IASC’s proposed standards.
Despite vaguely encouraging statements of SEC officials,35 the basic message of the SEC in
the past and of the recent FASB report is that other countries’ standards, including the IASC’s
proposed standards, are not sufficiently rigorous to protect investors in the U.S. securities markets. 
Consequently, it seems quite likely that the SEC will eventually reject the IASC’s efforts as
unnecessarily weakening the investor protections that are currently embodied in U.S.GAAP.
The consequences of the SEC’s decision are likely to be less substantial than the partisans in
the debate over IASs have indicated.  Officials of the New York Stock Exchange, and others, have
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 The SEC has, however, since 1990 (through Rule 144A) permitted private offerings to
institutional and sophisticated investors of the securities of non-U.S. companies without requiring
restatements to U.S. GAAP.
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 See Bloomer (1999).
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 See, for example, Sutton (1997).
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advocated adopting the IASC standards, or something similar, so as to enhance the role of the U.S.
exchanges in international securities markets.  They see the SEC requirement of restatement to
U.S.GAAP as substantially raising the costs of a U.S. securities listing for non-U.S. companies and
thereby discouraging U.S. listings and the use of the U.S. securities exchanges.  What seems to be
forgotten in this discussion is that a U.S. listing also carries with it the obligations to abide by the
entire panoply of federal securities laws, which are also seen as burdensome by non-U.S.
companies.  The elimination or modification of the U.S.GAAP requirement would not alter these
other securities laws obligations and would thus likely lead to far fewer new listings than the
advocates expect.
30
VII.  The Current Framework for Negotiations
Despite the Seattle experience, the WTO will likely remain an important forum for
continued negotiations with respect to international trade in services.  Negotiations with respect to
trade in accounting services should proceed ahead of many others, because of the advances that
have already been made with respect multilateral disciplines and guidelines on mutual recognition
agreements.  It is worth reviewing the structure of the GATS and its amplifications,36 which will be
the structure under which the negotiations will occur.37
A.  The GATS.
The GATS, which came into effect on January 1, 1995, is an extensive document that
applies to all WTO members (as of April 2000, there were 136 member countries) and is intended
to cover a broad range of services and circumstances.  The document contains general obligations
by member countries and narrower obligations that apply only to member countries that commit or
bind themselves to liberalized trade in specific services sectors.
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 A comparison between the listing of the barriers to trade in accounting services found in
Section V and the listing of the major liberalizing provisions of the GATS found in Section VII
yields an apparent disconnect.  The reasons for the discrepancy are threefold:  First, not all countries
are members of the GATS; second, as is discussed in the text below, not all members of the GATS
have scheduled the accountancy sector for liberalization commitments; and third, the provisions of
the GATS will not come into force until the conclusion of the round of negotiations that is
beginning in 2000.
     
37
 See also, for example, Altinger and Enders (1996) for a more extended discussion of the
GATS provisions.
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With respect to accounting services, the most important general-obligation provisions of the
GATS are as follows:38
-- Article II of the GATS establishes a general obligation for most favored nation (MFN)
treatment.39
-- Article III establishes a general obligation for transparency with respect to laws,
regulations, administrative guidelines, and similar measures that are relevant to trade in services. 
The transparency should include opportunities for inquiry and notification of significant changes.
-- Article VI applies to domestic regulation and requires members to ensure that
qualification requirements and procedures, technical standards and licensing requirements do not
constitute unnecessary barriers to trade.  Domestic regulatory requirements should be based on
objective and transparent criteria, such as competence and the ability to supply the service; should
be not more burdensome than necessary to ensure the quality of the service; and, with respect to
licensing procedures, should not in themselves be a restriction on the supply of the service. 
Members must provide an objective and impartial means of reviewing and providing appropriate
remedies for administrative decisions that affect in services.
- Article VII encourages mutual recognition of the qualifications of services providers. 
Member recognition of foreign qualifications should not constitute a means of discrimination
among countries in standards or criteria.  Multilateral processes are encouraged.
In addition to the general obligations, the most important specific obligations that apply
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 However, countries can specifically exempt a sector from MFN treatment.
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when a country has made specific commitments with respect to a specific services sector (in this
case, accounting) are as follows:40
-- Article VI requires that measures of general application that affect trade in services
should be administered in a reasonable, objective, and impartial fashion.  In addition, members
should provide adequate procedures for the mutual recognition of the competence of other
members.
-- Article XVI applies to market access and prohibits specific limitations (e.g., quotas) on
the number of suppliers; on the total value of service transactions or assets, including needs tests;
on the total number of service operations or total quantity of service output; on the total number of
people that may be employed; on the types of legal entity or joint venture through which a service
can be supplied; and on the participation of foreign capital.
-- Article XVII requires "national treatment"; i.e., members should accord to foreign
services and service suppliers treatment that is no less favorable than is applied to domestic services
and suppliers.  Specific treatment can be different, so long as the resultant conditions of competition
do not favor domestic services or service suppliers.
B.  Providing More Detail
Both the general and the for-the-committed-only GATS obligations are broadly worded. 
Detailed and specific negotiations are required to flesh out these broad provisions.  In order to
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 It is important to note that even when a member country decides to commit (bind) itself with
respect to a specific services sector, it can nevertheless do so with restrictions that limit the
application of the GATS provisions discussed below.  A member can list restrictions for an
individual country, or it can "horizontally" list restrictions that apply across a number of sectors.
33
facilitate these negotiations as applied to the accountancy sector, the WTO’s Council for Trade in
Services has adopted two additional measures that were developed by its Working Party on
Professional Services (WPPS).  First, in May 1997 the Council adopted non-binding guidelines for
mutual recognition agreements (MRAs) for the accountancy sector, which amplify the provisions of
Article VII of the GATS.  The guidelines provide an extensive framework that is intended to help
members structure their MRAs in ways that make them transparent and accessible.
Second, in December 1998 the Council adopted "disciplines" (rules) on domestic regulation
of the accountancy sector that amplify the provisions of Article VI.41  The disciplines provide
greater detail as to transparency, licensing requirements and procedures, qualification requirements
and procedures, and technical standards.
The disciplines implicitly recognize that regulation of accountancy is ubiquitous, but they
require members to ensure that such regulation is not more trade-restrictive than is necessary to
fulfill legitimate objectives, including protection of consumers, the quality of the service,
professional competency, and the integrity of the profession.  With respect to licensing, the
disciplines urge alternatives to residency requirements (e.g., allowing the posting of security bonds
to serve as an alternative method of ensuring accountability); acknowledge professional
organization membership requirements but require reasonable terms of membership; require that
the use of firm names not be restricted (except in fulfillment of a legitimate objective -- e.g., to
avoid consumer confusion); and require that licensing procedures be transparent and not
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 The disciplines specifically state that they are not meant to apply to measures that are covered
under the commitment (scheduling) provisions of Articles XVI and XVII.  It was this absence of
application that was part of the reason for the IFAC’s tepid endorsement of the disciplines.  For a
more extensive discussion of the disciplines and the negotiation processes, see Ascher (1999).
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unnecessarily burdensome.
With respect to qualifications, the disciplines require transparency and reasonable
procedures as to examinations and other qualifications and a link between the qualifications and the
activities for which the authorization is sought.  Members are required to take account of
qualifications (such as education, experience, and/or examinations) that have been acquired in other
countries.  They are encouraged to note the role that MRAs can play in facilitating the verification
of qualifications or establishing their equivalency.
With respect to technical standards (i.e., accounting standards or frameworks themselves),
the disciplines require that such standards be prepared, adopted, and applied only to fulfill
legitimate objectives.42
Finally, as was noted in Section II, the disciplines will not come into force until the
conclusion of the round of services negotiations that is starting in 2000; until that conclusion, the
members cannot raise new barriers to trade in accountancy services.
C.  An Evaluation.
It is tempting, and easy, to be pessimistic about the prospects for trade liberalization in
services.  In important respects, the GATS and its amplifications represent a gingerly, somewhat
tentative approach to liberalized trade.  It is riddled with exemptions:  Member countries can simply
decide which sectors they wish to commit to the obligations of Article XVI (market access), Article
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 As Ascher (1999) notes, the WPPS concluded that the harmonization of accounting
frameworks was not a major goal for the disciplines, since the frameworks were primarily within
the purview of the IOSCO and the IASC.
35
XVII (national treatment), and parts of Article VI (domestic regulation); even for committed
sectors, members can still list and maintain restrictions; and even a general obligation like MFN
(Article II) can be avoided by a member for specific sectors.  Further, the accountancy disciplines
did not tackle Article XVI (market access) and XVII (national treatment) issues, such as residency
and citizenship requirements and more rigorous requirements for foreign applicants than for
domestic applicants.
In addition, despite going into effect in 1995, the general principles of the GATS (and the
more specific details of the accountancy disciplines of 1998) will not actually have a positive
impact in reducing barriers (though they will prevent the raising of new barriers) to trade in services
until the conclusion of negotiations that are beginning in 2000.  Given the experiences of past
rounds of trade negotiations (and the experience of the recent Seattle disruptions), this conclusion
might well occur only in the middle of the decade.  Thus, real impact might be delayed for almost a
decade after the inauguration of the GATS.
Despite this multitude of limitations, undue pessimism with respect to the future of trade
liberalization in services is not warranted.43  The GATS is a new phenomenon with respect to
multilateral agreements for services; and, as was discussed in Sections III and V of this paper,
services are a highly sensitive area where domestic regulation is widespread and where domestic
sovereignty issues remain potent.  As the 50 years of experience with the GATT has indicated,
completely free trade is an unrealistic goal, even over a five decade period.  Progress is slow; the
forces of protectionism are powerful.  But the extent of progress in the GATT has been substantial,
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and the trend remains positive.
The same realistic perspective should be applied to any appraisal of the GATS.  Progress
will be slow, especially since services are a more sensitive area.  The GATS does represent
progress.  The political imperative will be to keep the momentum going in the direction of freer
trade.
37
VIII.  The Road Ahead
As of early 1999 there had been commitments by 67 members44 of the WTO with respect to
accounting/auditing/bookkeeping services, of which 26 were developed countries45 and 41
represented developing and transition economies.46  Though these 67 countries represent only half
of the WTO’s membership, they do represent about 90% of international revenues for accounting
services.47   Detailed analyses of these commitments, however, indicate that many fall far short of a
total embrace of free trade in accounting services.48  Also, as would be expected, the commitments
by the developing and transition economies’ governments are more limited than those of the
developed country governments.49  And the extent of restrictions in commitments is greater for the
"commercial presence" and "temporary presence" modes of delivery, which are the important
modes for accounting, than for the remaining two modes.  Still, the commitments represent a
starting basis for negotiations and opportunities for further openings.
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 See WTO (1998, 1999).  Among the major developing countries that are members of the
WTO but that did not make specific commitments with respect to accountancy were Egypt, India,
Indonesia, Pakistan, and the Philippines.
     
47
 Ascher (1999).
     
48
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Altinger and Enders (1996).
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The basic principles encouraged by the GATS -- MFN treatment (Article II), transparency
(Article III), restraining domestic regulation to legitimate ends (article VI), mutual recognition
(Article VII), market access (Article XVI), and national treatment (Article XVII) -- should be
strenuously pursued.  Along these lines, the first goals should be the widespread elimination of the
most egregious forms of regulatory protectionism of domestic accounting entities that clearly have
little to do with consumer protection and that are fundamentally anti-consumer, since they raise
costs and/or reduce the quality of accounting services.  Included on this list should be the following
items (along with the GATS articles that are likely to apply):
-- Restrictions on the use of foreign firms’ brand names (Article VI and disciplines).
-- Restrictions on the mobility of personnel (Article XVI).
-- Discriminatory taxation (Article XVII).
-- Discriminatory licensing arrangements (Article VI and disciplines; Article XVI).
-- Quantitative limits on the provision of services (Article VI and disciplines; Article XVI).
-- Restrictions on legal structural forms (Article XVI).
-- Restrictions on advertising, promotion, and pricing (Article VI and Article XVI).
-- Buy national policies (Article XIII; Article XVI; Article XVII).
-- Nationality, residence, or establishment requirements (Articles VI and disciplines; Article
XVI; Article XVII).
-- Ownership restrictions (Articles VI; Article XVI; Article XVII).
This is an ambitious agenda.  Wherever possible, negotiators should focus on the general
obligation articles (i.e., Articles II and III and parts of Article VI) rather than the for-the-committed-
only articles (e.g., Articles XVI and XVII).
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If all or most of these restrictions can be eliminated among most of the WTO’s 136
members, much will be achieved.  Attention can then be turned to the tougher questions of mutual
recognition of qualifications (Article VII),50 protection of intellectual property, and restrictions on
payments (Article XII).
These negotiations are unlikely to be easy.  The heavy hands of domestic regulation will
surely be important inertial forces.  But the Asian financial crises of 1997 should provide added
power and urgency to the arguments favoring freer trade in accounting services, especially in
developing and transition economies:
It is clear that poor accounting practices by local banks and other important local enterprises
in a number of Asian countries were partially responsible for the problems that arose.  Liberalized
trade in accounting services would provide greater opportunities for entry and for greater local
influence by the large international accounting firms.  In turn, these large firms -- with their greater
ability to mobilize expertise, their general culture of higher accounting standards, and their
substantial international reputations at stake -- are likely to be stronger forces for more reliable
accounting and auditing.51  Indeed, the World Bank apparently has informally asked the Big Five to
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are even more serious when a "sister" management consulting arm of the auditing firm may also be
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avoid signing financial statements that, although prepared in accordance with local accounting
standards, are below prevailing international standards.52  In an era of the increasing globalization
of financial markets, this strengthening of the accounting/auditing function in many countries
should be quite valuable in aiding their abilities to access those markets.53
                                                                                                                                                            
engaged by the audited company.   But the greater reputations of the large firms mean that they
have more to lose from subsequent revelations of shoddy work, which in turn should make them
less likely to be tempted to stray.
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 See, for example, McKee and Garner (1992, 1996), Riahi-Belkaoui (1994), Saudagaran and
Diga (1997), and McKee et al. (1998).
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IX.  Conclusion
Accounting is an essential infrastructural element of the business sector in any modern
economy; it is crucial for finance.  Efficiency in the way that accounting services are delivered can
enhance the efficiency of the rest of the economy.
The large accounting firms are already international in scope and operation.  But national
regulatory restrictions hobble their ability to operate fluidly across national boundaries in ways that
would best serve their clients.  International trade in accounting services is substantially impaired.
The GATS negotiations that are beginning in 2000 hold the promise for important
liberalizations of trade in accounting services.  These negotiations should be pursued vigorously,
with efforts to expand the countries involved, expand their commitments, and conclude the
negotiations promptly.  The gains from this vigorous pursuit will be substantial.
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Table 1:  Percentages of Domestic Revenues Attributable to Major
Lines of Activity, Largest U.S. Accounting Firms, 1998
Largest Largest
    100 Firms 5 Firms
Accounting/Auditing   30%  30%
Tax   23   19
Management consulting   47   51
Total  100% 100%
Source: Accounting Today, "The Top 100 Firms," Special Supplement
(March 15 - April 4, 1999), p. 5.
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Table 2:  The Numbers of Countries in Which the Largest Twenty
International Accounting Firms/Networks Have Operations,
1998/1999
PricewaterhouseCoopers 150
Andersen Worldwide  81
Ernst & Young International 133
KPMG International 157
Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu 135
BDO International  86
Grant Thornton International  91
Horwath International  86
RSM Internationala  74
Moores Rowland International  87
Summit International Associates  58
Nexia International  78
PKF International 108
Fiducial International  60
HLB International  90
Moore Stephens International  75
AGN International  67
MacIntyre Strater International  83
IGAF  57
BKR International  60
a
 Includes McGladrey & Pullen.
Source: Accountancy International, 124 (August 1999), p. 8; and
WTO (1998, p. 4).
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Table 3:  Sizes of the Forty Largest International Accounting Firms/Networks, 1998/1999
Revenue  No. of  No. of    No. of
  ($ billions)  Offices Partners  Prof. Staff
PricewaterhouseCoopers  $15.3   1,183  10,000   146,000
Andersen Worldwide   13.9     412   2,788    93,916
Ernst & Young   10.9     675   6,200    58,700
KPMG   10.4     825   6,790    64,510
Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu    9.0     725   5,608    60,790
Total for Big Five:   59.5   3,820  31,386   292,516
BDO International    1.6     510   1,732    12,176
Grant Thornton International    1.5     584   2,335    12,725
Horwath International    1.2     369   1,790    11,280
RSM Internationala    1.2     524   1,864    10,623
Moores Rowland International    1.1     603   1,884    10,717
Total for next five:    6.6   2,590   9,605    57,521
Total for next 30:   11.2   6,964  19,169   114,924
Grand total for all 40:   77.3  13,374  60,160   464,961
Big Five as a % of grand total:   77% 29% 52%   63%
a
 Includes McGladrey & Pullen.
Source: Accountancy International, 124 (August 1999), p. 8.
